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Abstract
Countries with high income inequality also show a strong association between parents’
and children’s economic well-being; i.e. low intergenerational mobility. This study is the
first to test this relationship in a between and within country setup, using harmonized
micro data from 18 Latin American countries spanning multiple cohorts. It is shown that
experiencing higher income inequality in childhood is associated with lower intergener-
ational mobility as adults. Furthermore, the influence of economic growth and public
education is evaluated: both have a positive, significant, and substantial effect on intergen-
erational mobility.
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1 Introduction
The view of researchers and the public on inequality has been changing over the course of time.
While the classical approach suggested that inequality might be beneficial because of his motivating
nature (Keynes, 1920), it changed to be seen as simply part of the process of economic development
with no direct causal interrelation (Kuznets, 1955). Later, economists theorized that the shape of the
income distribution has a significant impact on growth rates and that, for instance, higher levels of
inequality have a negative impact on economic performance (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Atkinson,
1997; Bénabou, 1996; Corneo and Jeanne, 2001; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Persson and Tabellini, 1994).1
Finally, empirical studies evidenced a strong association between inequality and clearly detrimental
patterns for a society, like higher crime, drug use and persistent poverty (Wilkinson and Pickett,
2009), and recently an OECD report even titled “Why Less Inequality Benefits All” (OECD, 2015).
Actually, egalitarian theories of justice since the influential works of Rawls (1971) and Sen (1980)
suggest that, from a normative point of view, the key to understand whether it is worth to care
more or less about the income distribution within a society - i.e. on (in)equality of outcomes - is the
evaluation of (in)equality of opportunities.
Equality of opportunity is a long studied subject and mostly one of the primary goals of pol-
icy makers. The fundamental discussion concerns hereby the distinction between inequality of out-
comes resulting from individual efforts and inequality of resources deriving from given circumstances
(Roemer, 2000). Recently, the topic has been extensively debated because of an alarming finding: In
countries where income inequality is high, there is also a strong association between parents’ and chil-
dren’s economic well-being (i.e. low intergenerational mobility).2 Indeed, the negative relationship
between inequality and intergenerational mobility has yet been hypothesized in past by some influ-
ential theoretical contributions; starting from the seminal studies by Becker and Tomes (1979) and
Loury (1981), to macroeconomic models among others by Galor and Zeira (1993), Owen and Weil
(1998), Maoz and Moav (1999) and Hassler et al. (2007). The presence of such a relationship would
mean, in simple terms, that when inequality is high, the same families persist over (two or more)
generations at the top or bottom of the income distribution. A graph visualizing this phenomenon
across countries is well-known as the Great Gatsby Curve.3
Finding a clear link between an unequal distribution of income, low social mobility and the per-
sistence of economic inequality would probably be the strongest motivation, especially for policy
1A stimulating survey on researcher’s view on inequality can be found in Galor (2009). See also Furman and Stiglitz
(1998) for an overview of the consequences of inequality for economic growth.
2The concepts of equality of opportunity and social intergenerational mobility are arguably very close to each other.
Brunori et al. (2013) find even a strong correlation between common indices of inequality of opportunity and measures
of intergenerational mobility. For some viewpoints, and a discussion on similarities and differences of the two constructs,
see Roemer (2004, 2012) and Corak (2013a).
3The Great Gatsby Curve was addressed by Alan Kruger as chairman of the council of economic advisers in a speech
titled “The Rise and Consequences of Inequality in the United States” on January 12, 2012, at the Center for American
Progress. The original analysis and a discussion can be found in Corak (2013b,a).
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makers, to care about income inequality. However, most empirical studies on the relationship be-
tween income inequality and intergenerational mobility focus on comparisons between countries.
Hence, the existing evidence so far does not allow to exclude that the association might be merely
driven by cross-country heterogeneity, for instance in institutions. Only few recent studies investigate
the relationship restricting the analysis within one single country (e.g. Chetty et al., 2014b,a; Güell
et al., 2015). So, more research with comparable data on multiple countries and cohorts is crucial for
our understanding about the interplay between income inequality and intergenerational mobility (as
pointed out for example by Jäntti and Jenkins, 2015). The purpose of the present study is to deepen
our understanding of this relationship, applying a profound empirical analysis on harmonized survey
data for 18 distinct countries and spanning multiple cohorts. Its main contribution is to test whether
a negative relationship exists in a between and within country set up.
The laboratory for this exercise is Latin America: Two different sources of harmonized household
survey data allow to perform such a comparative analysis, controlling for cross country heterogeneity.
An interesting fact is that while worldwide inequality has been constantly rising, Latin American
countries have followed this trend for a while, and eventually many of them experienced a significant
decrease in inequality in the last decade (Gasparini et al., 2011; Cord et al., 2013). So, sufficient
variation of the explanatory mechanisms should be given at the between as well as at the within
country level. Furthermore, the usual limitation that only information on educational attainment is
available, is overcome constructing a measure for the individual relative educational position, which
shows to be a better proxy for well being across countries and over time. Three analytical steps are
pursued: First, a simple stylized analysis is applied to account for the displacements of countries along
the Great Gatsby Curve. Then, the association between inequality experienced in childhood (and
adolescence) and intergenerational mobility as adults is estimated. Finally, the influence of economic
growth and public expenditure in education is evaluated; two features which has been theorized in
past to influence inequality and intergenerational mobility.
The main findings are the following: Estimations performed on two different data sets all confirm
the link portrayed by the Great Gatsby Curve. Indeed, individuals who experienced higher (lower)
income inequality in childhood or adolescence – i.e. when parental investment in human capital is cru-
cial – show significantly lower (higher) intergenerational mobility as adults. Especially, this negative
relationship is driven by lower upward mobility of individuals at the bottom of the distribution. These
results are robust and do not change adopting different specifications. Further analyses show, that one
of the driving forces behind this relationship might be economic growth, and that public expendi-
tures in education show the expected positive association with intergenerational mobility. Altogether,
the crucial importance of private and public investment in children’s human capital is confirmed; the
latter being a channel to support higher intergenerational mobility. This last finding has important
implications for public policies to enhance equality of opportunity in a society.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical
literature on the relationship between inequality and intergenerational mobility. Section 3 describes
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the data and presents the applied measurements. In Section 4 and 5 the results are presented in four
distinct subsections. The first two, focus on the descriptive findings: 4.1 shows estimated intergener-
ational mobility rates of an older and younger cohort in 18 Latin American countries; 4.2 provides
a stylized analysis on inequality and mobility in Latin America and shows the within country dis-
placements on the Great Gatsby Curve. Then, the main empirical results of the paper are presented:
5.1 displays the estimated association between inequality experienced in childhood and intergenera-
tional mobility as adults; 5.2 visualizes the magnitude of factors associated to the intergenerational
persistence of socioeconomic status. Section 6 concludes.
2 Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility: The State of the Art
The relationship between inequality and intergenerational mobility, as a broad measure of equality
of opportunity, is of crucial importance for various dimensions of economic development.4 Indeed,
recent studies on the relationship between income inequality and growth found opposite effects when
the distribution of income is determined by inequality of opportunities or by inequality of efforts, be-
ing negative in the first and positive in the second case (Marrero and Rodríguez, 2013). Similar results
have been found by authors who dedicated to the study of inequality of educational attainments: They
confirm that rising human capital enhances growth and economic development, but only conditional
on the degree of educational inequality (Cuaresma et al., 2013; Sauer and Zagler, 2014). Education
takes place early in life and shapes strongly individual opportunities. The choice of certain educa-
tional tracks and first educational attainments are strongly determined by circumstances out of the
influence of the individual (for a recent survey, see Heckman and Mosso, 2014). Hence, these findings
can be interpreted as further evidence for the detrimental impact of inequality of opportunities, and
the crucial role they play in a comprehensive analysis of income inequality.
In past, the subject has been analyzed in some influential theoretical contributions which concep-
tualize the mechanisms behind the intergenerational transmission of inequality.5 The main intuition
is that family endowments inherited from parents to children play a crucial role in the mechanisms
underlying the transmission. Moreover, rising income inequality between families leads to higher in-
equality of investment in children’s human capital, and thus to lower upward mobility of children
descending from poorer households. This implications arise from the seminal models by Becker and
Tomes (1979, 1986), Loury (1981) and the adaptations done by Solon (1992).6 Later models built
mainly on this framework (e.g. Owen and Weil, 1998; Maoz and Moav, 1999; Galor and Zeira, 1993;
Hassler et al., 2007). Especially in this last branch of studies, an important weight is attributed to
4The conceptual discussion on equality of opportunity has its origins in Philosophy (see among others Dworkin,
1981b,a). For a recent review, see Roemer and Trannoy (2015).
5Actually, the idea that in Capitalist societies class reproduction and the persistence of inequality depend mainly on the
initial distribution of wealth is the core of Marx’s analysis and finds space in even older thoughts.
6Extensions to Gary Solon’s first contribution are Solon (1999, 2002, 2004, 2014).
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credit market constraints that limit private investment in human capital, and to public investment in
human capital as one of the major contrasting forces of this dynamic.
The theoretical models are basically built on the assumption that parents derive utility, apart from
their present consumption level, also from the future utility of their children. Therefore, parents
invest mainly in the human capital of their children to raise their future income and, thus, utility. If
the investment is exclusively private, budget constraints limit the investment choices of families and
lead - especially in presence of credit market imperfections - to the persistence of inequality from one
generation to the next; i.e. poor parents are unable to invest in the human capital of their children, who
therefore are unable to afford better income opportunities for themselves and to climb up the social
ladder. Consequently, when income becomes more unequally distributed, inequality of investment in
children’s human capital rises, causing low intergenerational mobility, social stratification, and even
higher income inequality in the following generation.
Empirically, the question if parental income and credit constrains are determinant for disparities
in human capital investments is far from being solved, as pointed out for example by Piketty (2000)
in an older review about intergenerational mobility, and Black and Devereux (2011) in a more recent
one. Actually, the association might be even stronger, if altruism and the propensity to invest in
children’s human capital are positively associated with (relative and absolute) income. Furthermore,
other direct and indirect effects of certain parental background features play an important role, like
parental education or cognitive abilities (e.g. the possibility to support children in their educational
career and the informational advantage about the value of certain degrees on the labor market), as well
as so-called network and neighborhood effects (Benabou, 1996; Durlauf, 1996). Genetic transmission
of abilities might also be a significant channel, as accounted for in some of the above mentioned
models; although relatively weak in comparison to other family endowments as recent research has
shown (Black et al., 2015).7 What is sure, is that albeit credit constrains are only one of many factors
determining the formation of human capital, and simply providing income transfers to poor families
would certainly not solve the problem of inequality in children’s opportunities (as pointed out e.g. by
Heckman and Mosso, 2014), the cross country relationship between inequality and mobility shows
that it is still a factor to account for seriously.
Observing the dynamics of the process within a society, as a logical consequence of the above ex-
plained mechanisms, we would expect rising income inequality to cause lower intergenerational mobil-
ity. However, although the cross country association between income inequality and intergenerational
mobility has been investigated extensively (e.g. Aizer, 2014; Andrews and Leigh, 2009; Björklund and
Jäntti, 2012; Blanden, 2013; Brunori et al., 2013; Checchi et al., 1999; Corak, 2013b,a; Holter, 2015;
Jerrim and Macmillan, 2015), within-country evidence is still rare on this point. The influential works
by Chetty et al. (2014b,a) use administrative data on income to estimate intergenerational mobility
trends across geographical areas in the US. Their results show that mobility varies significantly across
areas, and that areas with high inequality display low rates of mobility, as predicted by the theoretical
7For a review on so-called “Nature and Nurture” effects, see Sacerdote (2011).
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models and evidenced by the Great Gatsby Curve. This is confirmed by the analysis of Güell et al.
(2015) on a sample of 103 Italian provinces using a novel measurement of intergenerational mobility
based on the correlation of economic well-being by rare surnames.8 However, observing time trends,
Chetty et al. (2014b) find that intergenerational mobility - measured as the conditional correlation of
parents’ and childrens’ rank in the income distribution, children’s college attendance, and other mea-
sures - has not fallen in the US despite of rising inequality, confirming earlier findings by Lee and Solon
(2009). The authors explain this by the fact that the rise of inequality in the US was mainly driven
by top incomes (Piketty and Saez, 2003), while mobility depends to a larger extent on “middle class”
inequality (i.e. among the bottom 99 % of the income distribution) as their own findings highlight.
One of the very few studies analyzing cross sectional inequality and intergenerational mobility trends
in a developing country is Fan et al. (2015) for China. They find evidence for an existence of a Great
Gatsby Curve within China, observing declining mobility rates along with rising inequality during
the economic transition. Similar approaches to the one applied in the present study are recent analyses
by Cingano (2014) on OECD countries using PIACC data, and by Kerney and Levine (2016) on the
association between inequality and the probability to drop out from school in the US. Both confirm
the negative relationship between inequality and intergenerational mobility.
The application here is on Latin America, where income inequality has been falling during the last
decades. Following the insights given by the theoretical models, a decline in the dispersion of parental
investment in children’s human capital should be expected as well (ceteris paribus), and younger gen-
erations should display higher intergenerational mobility. However, parental investment is only one
aspect. Indeed, it has to be taken into account that the interplay between three institutions determines
the amount of intergenerational mobility in a society: The family, the market, and the state (Corak,
2013b). The family, mainly due to the inheritance of endowments from parents to children, for exam-
ple trough investments in human capital, genetic transmission of abilities, or the heritage of certain
values.9 On the latter, empirical research found for example a positive association between income
inequality and stronger work ethic (Corneo and Neher, 2013) what might lead to higher intergener-
ational mobility.10 The market, since higher returns to investment in human capital might act as an
incentive for families to invest more and, thus, raise mobility (Solon, 2014). The state, providing pub-
lic investment in human capital for families that cannot afford an efficient amount of it due to budget
constrains (Davies et al., 2005). Additionally on this last point, Ichino et al. (2011) argue that political
institutions influence strongly the degree of persistence of socioeconomic status in a society and are
one of the main explanations of cross-country differences in intergenerational mobility estimates.
8This measure of intergenerational mobility was first proposed by Guell et al. (2015).
9Some authors related also different fertility choices of poor and rich households to the persistence of poverty (e.g.
Moav, 2005).
10Furthermore, Corneo (2013) develops a model where the transmission of values towards a stronger work ethic depends
on the characteristics of the labor market, as well as on the amplitude of the welfare state. Indeed, he empirically finds a
correlation between higher intergenerational (occupation) mobility, and the generosity of unemployment benefits.
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Another important aspect might be the timing of the investment in human capital. As pointed
out, among others, by Heckman and Mosso (2014), investments are more effective at earlier ages,
while interventions in adolescence may have only short run effects. Anyway, as various branches of
research evidenced, the role of parental background for children’s outcomes is important over various
stages of life (Ermisch et al., 2012).
3 Data & Measurement
3.1 Data
Studies on intergenerational mobility are always methodically and conceptually constrained by the
available data.11 Ideally, the requirement for an empirical analysis of intergenerational mobility is the
availability of valid measures (or good proxies) for permanent income of parents and children. Fur-
thermore, for cross-country comparisons to be meaningful, the data must be as comparable as possible
between countries. Research on intergenerational mobility in developing countries faces a further
complication: Since panels are an absolute rarity in developing countries, there are only two ways to
obtain information on the economic outcomes (e.g. educational attainments, occupation) of both,
parents and children. The first, is to restrict the analysis to children and parents still living in the
same household. The second, is to use the information given by retrospective questions on parental
characteristics. Estimates deriving from the first should be biased by the truncation and non represen-
tativeness of the sample, since adult children which left the household because of marriage, college or
other reasons are not taken into account.12 The second alternative should, therefore, be more appro-
priate to study intergenerational mobility. However, not all surveys work with retrospective questions
to obtain information on parental characteristics.
The data sources used in this study fulfill all the required prerequisites: First, the public opinion
survey Latinobarometro, which since 1995 records individual and household characteristics of a nation-
ally representative sample of adult respondents in 18 Latin American countries, including questions
about own and parental education (since 1998).13 Second, a newly created micro data set which pools
11The three “W” of mobility analysis, as termed by Jäntti and Jenkins (2015): mobility of What, among Whom, and
When. See also Björklund and Jäntti (2012) for an overview.
12Although intuitively the problem is clear enough, research on the actual degree of the bias is rare. Only recently, a
study by Emran et al. (2016) has shown that the bias is severe on measures of mobility that do not take into account the
variances of the dependent and independent variable, like the intergenerational regression coefficient, and less strong for
normalized measurements, like the standardized intergenerational correlation.
13The Latinobarómetro survey comprises every year a sample of 1000 to 1200 individuals per country. It is carried out
by local firms under technical supervision of the Latinobarómetro Corporation, a private non-profit organization based
in Santiago (Chile). The study receives financing from Latin American and non-Latin American governments, the private
sector, and international organizations. Among others: IADB (Inter-American Development Bank), UNDP (United Na-
tions Development Programme), AECI (Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional), SIDA (Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency), CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency), CAF (Corporación Andina
de Fomento), OAS (Organization of American States), United States Office of Research, IDEA International, UK Data
Archive. The Dominican Republic was included for the first time in 2004, raising the country total to 18.
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several household surveys for 9 Latin American countries; all surveys which could be identified to
ask directly with retrospective questions about the educational attainments of parents.14 While the
Latinobarometro data is harmonized ex-ante, the data set which comprises different household surveys
is harmonized ex-post. The countries included in the latter are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru. Tables A1 to A4 show some weighted descrip-
tive statistics of the samples which comprise 120,166 (Latinobarometro) and 390,404 (Harmonized
Household Surveys) individuals, who were born after 1970, at least 18 years old when the survey was
conducted, and with available information on own and parental education.15 The number of observa-
tions by country is much more balanced in Latinobarometro, ranging from 3,926 in the Dominican
Republic to 8,035 in Mexico, while in the second data set it varies from the 2,360 observations of
Nicaragua to the 130,750 of Chile.
Since Latinobarometro is a survey created appositely for cross country comparisons, the means of
year of birth, age, and sex are rather uniform across countries, while in the data set constructed from
various household surveys there are notable differences. Also, the codification of completed years of
education of parents and children is uniform in Latinobarometro, but diverges between countries in
the other sample. This is due to the fact that in some countries the definition of education was ex-
panded to higher ordered degrees in some survey years, as for example a doctoral degree in Panama,
coded with 24 years of education. In order to make use of all the available information, the main anal-
ysis with the household survey data is performed keeping the different specifications across countries
and surveys. However, suitable robustness checks are performed, coding years of education uniformly
across countries, based on levels of education indicated in all surveys according to the same standard,
and following the definition made by Latinobarometro.16 As can be seen clearly, the two data sets are
fundamentally different from each other, and the samples of single countries are not necessarily com-
parable between data sets. For instance, while the samples of Chile and Colombia seem to be rather
similar between Latinobarometro and the harmonized household survey data set, in other countries,
especially in Ecuador and Nicaragua, less cohorts are available in the latter. Also, after excluding
individuals without information on parental education, the distribution of males and females is unbal-
14The data presented here is used in a parallel project to compute a new macro data set of intergenerational mobility
trends over a span of more than 50 years (Gasparini, Neidhöfer and Serrano, forthcoming).
15A priori, the analysis could be sensitive to the chosen age restriction, because some individuals might not have com-
pleted yet their educational career at this age. The age when education was finished by individuals, included as question
in the 2013 wave of the Latinobarometro survey, shows that the mean age when education is completed in Latin America
is 17.7, ranging from a mean age of approximately 15 in Honduras to approximately 20 in Brazil. Suitable robustness
checks imposing different age restrictions (e.g. older than 21) has been performed, with no significant changes in the main
analysis. The results can be found in the Online Appendix.
16As usual in the literature, the highest parental degree – or in case of missing information of one parent, the only one
available – is used to measure parental education. The codification of completed years of education in Latinobarometro and
the alternative specification in the household survey sample, are shown in the Online Appendix. The specification used in
the main analysis with the latter follows the actually indicated completed years of education in the respective household
survey.
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anced in the pooled survey data of some countries.17 Due to all these reasons, the descriptive analysis
is not comparable between the two data sets, while the within-sample analysis maintains its validity
and is particularly useful.
Information on income inequality are extracted from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean (SEDLAC; CEDLAS and The World Bank), which is the main source of infor-
mation regarding inequality, poverty and other labor market or social indicators for Latin America.18
The SEDLAC data relies on harmonized micro data from over 300 household surveys carried out in
24 Latin American and Caribbean countries and represents in each period more than 97 % of the total
population in the region.19 For the main analysis, the Gini coefficient of disposable household per
capita income is used, for which the first spells varies from 1974 (in Argentina) to 2001 (in Colom-
bia).20 Information on economic growth, measured by GDP per capita in USD (constant at 2005
market prices), and on public expenditures in education, measured as percentage of GDP, derive from
World Bank data and are reported yearly since 1970.21 All the used data sources share the great advan-
tage of assuring the best possible comparability between different countries and over time.22
3.2 Measurement
The established way to measure intergenerational mobility in a society, is to estimate the following
equation:
Y t = α+βY t−1+ ε,
where Y is a measure of permanent income or lifetime earnings for two subsequent generations within
a family. The coefficient β , thus, measures the degree of persistence in socioeconomic status from
17This is especially evident in Peru, where nearly 80 % of the sample are men. The reason in this case, is that from 2002
on, in the ENAHO household survey the education of parents is asked only to household heads who are, in most cases,
male.
18The date of the statistics used in this version of the paper is November 2014.
19Most household surveys included in SEDLAC are nationally representative. However, in some countries also surveys
are used which cover only urban areas (in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay and Uruguay). Still, in these countries
the urban population represents the vast majority of the national population (e.g. 85 % in Argentina). Further computa-
tions make the data comparable if deriving from different surveys for the same country, and fill up missing data points by
interpolation; estimates obtained without interpolation are however not significantly different to the main results in this
study. For further information on methodological issues see “A guide to the SEDLAC: Socioeconomic Database for Latin
America and the Caribbean.” (CEDLAS and The World Bank, 2012). For an exhaustive discussion of the SEDLAC data
see also Bourguignon (2015).
20Results do not change when using the Gini coefficient of equivalised household income, instead.
21In the estimations concerning the early childhood period, the starting age of compulsory education is used instead of
public expenditures in education.
22While the Latinobarometro survey is designed for comparable analyses between countries and over time, household
surveys are not uniform across Latin American countries and significantly differ in geographical coverage and question-
naires, sometimes also within countries over time. Although important improvements have been made by Latin American
governments in the last years, the issue of comparability is still a great concern. However, the SEDLAC data is made with
the greatest possible effort to make statistics comparable across countries and over time by using similar definitions of
variables and by applying consistent methods. The same applies for World Bank data.
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parents (t− 1) to children (t ). Higher values of β display a higher association between parents’ and
children’s well being, and therefore a lower intergenerational mobility, and vice versa.
The information which is more likely to be available in household surveys for both, parents and
children, is completed years of education. In absence of accurate information on long-run earnings,
using education is arguably the best way to identify (lifetime) socio-economic status, since the use of
income “snapshots” to approximate ( log) lifetime earnings leads to serious bias in the intergenerational
mobility estimates (Nybom and Stuhler, 2016).23 Furthermore, retrospective information on educa-
tional attainment is less affected by measurement error than information on income or earnings. As
Blanden (2013) shows with a small sample of countries, intergenerational mobility estimates obtained
using educational attainment are highly correlated across countries with the best available estimates
using income.
A comparable measure of intergenerational mobility across different countries and over different
time periods is obtained through a linear transformation of parents’ and children’s educational attain-
ments. The new outcome variable is centered around 0 which displays the mean years of education
of even-aged people, born in the same year, of the same sex, and living in the same country. The ob-
tained regression coefficient is thus a measurement which is close to the well-known intergenerational
correlation, but has the main advantage to consider the inequality transmission of human capital, a
dimension which gets lost if applying the latter.24
[Figure 1 here]
The performed transformation of completed years of education has several further advantages:
First, it offers an intuitive way to evaluate the relative position of parents and children with regard to
their reference group, yielding an outcome variable which is more indicative of socioeconomic status
than educational attainment alone. Indeed, a sensitivity analysis shows that the relative educational
position obtained trough a linear transformation is a more suitable indicator for well being and relative
socioeconomic status across time than simply evaluating completed years of education (see Figure
1). Second, the assumption of linearity is less strong than using completed years of education and
the relative educational position is closer to a normal distribution.25 Third, the obtained variable
is a measurement for relative standing and thus conceptually closer to rank-based measures, which
in the case of income have been proved to be more robust and less affected by bias (Chetty et al.,
23Studies for the US have shown that proper measurements of intergenerational persistence of income can only be
obtained with more than ten years of income spells for both, parents and children (Solon, 1992).
24The intergenerational correlation is obtained multiplying the regression coefficient by the ratio of the standard de-
viations of parents’ and children’s outcome and, thus, adjusts for differences in inequality between generations. This is
intentionally avoided here, since the inequality of human capital is an interesting dimension which should not be taken
out of the evaluation. Anyway, to provide a comparison to the previous literature, also estimates have been computed i)
without any normalization of completed years of education and ii) using the Z-Score of parental education. All estimations
basically confirm the main results and can be found in the Online Appendix.
25The exploration of non-linearities in the relationship is addressed in section 5.2. Further analysis on the normality
assumption can be found in the Online Appendix.
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2014a; Nybom and Stuhler, 2015). It should therefore be the appropriate measure to compare different
countries and cohorts consistently.
In the first part of the analysis, the following baseline equation is estimated on the pooled sample
for people born 1980 to 1987 (older cohort) and 1988 to 1995 (younger cohort):
yic = α+
18
∑
k=1
βk · ypic ·Cic+
18
∑
k=1
ξk ·Cic+
18
∑
k=1
δ 0k(Xic ·Cic)+ εic, (1)
where yic = (Yic−Y )/Y and ypic = (Y pic −Y p)/Y p indicate the relative educational position with respect
to the reference group, being Yic the completed years of education of individual i in country c, Y pic of
her parents, and Y (Y p) the mean years of education of her (her parents’) reference group; i.e. people
of the same age, sex, country and cohort.26 C is a dummy variable that equals one if i lives in country c
and zero otherwise; ξ captures thus the country fixed effects. X comprises individual controls for sex,
age (polynomial), and survey year. Estimating equation (1) yields thus β coefficients for the 18 Latin
American countries under evaluation.
In the second part, the macro-level characteristics inequality (Q jc), economic growth (G jc), and
public investment in human capital (Z jc) are included in the estimations to analyze their association
with individual outcomes. For this purpose, the variable for parental educational position is interacted
with the relevant macro-level variables. What is hereby of crucial importance, is how the macro-level
characteristics are associated to individuals. Actually, measuring inequality and intergenerational mo-
bility at the same time (e.g. in the same year) would imply the strong assumption that countries are in
the steady-state, and within country differences would not be caught up properly. The applied strategy
takes these aspects into account, and evaluates the macro-level characteristics when the individual was
in a period of life when investments in human capital are essential.27
Three lifetime periods are identified when parental (or public) investment in human capital is
essential: (A) Early childhood, defined as the age interval from 0 to 6, (B) Primary school age, from age
6 to 12, and (C) Adolescence, from age 12 to 18. Then, the mean of the relevant macro characteristics
are matched to individuals according to the country where they live and the respective age intervals
mentioned before.28 This method allows to have enough variation in the independent variables; not
also between but also within countries as shown in Figure A1.
26Since it would make no sense to compare the parents of people of different sex and age distinctly, the measure for
parental education is normalized only by country and year of birth.
27Of course, investment in human capital may be made at every stage of life and up to older ages. However, as shown
by many studies, human capital investments are more effective and have a longer lasting effect, the earlier they take place.
See among others Ermisch et al. (2012); Heckman and Mosso (2014) for an overview of the importance of investment in
human capital at different moments of children’s lifetime.
28A very simple example taking inequality measured by the Gini coefficient as macro level variable: For an individual
born 1986 in Argentina, the mean of the Gini coefficient in Argentina from 1986 to 1992 (0.454) is associated to early
childhood, from 1992 to 1998 (0.469) to primary school age, and from 1998 to 2004 (0.509) to adolescence.
11
4 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Formally, the following equation is estimated separately for the three specifications (A), (B), and
(C) mentioned above
yi jc = α+βypi jc+δ
0Xi jc+ γ1 · ypi jc ·Q jc+ τ1Q jc+ γ2 · ypi jc ·G jc+ τ2G jc+ γ3 · ypi jc ·Z jc+ τ3Z jc+
18
∑
k=1
ξk ·Cic+ εi jc, (2)
restricting some of the coefficients to be zero in different estimations. Subscript j is added and denotes
i’s birth cohort. Equation (2) enables to evaluate how the relationship between yi jc and ypi jc varies
at different levels of the macro characteristics under evaluation. These are all centered on the sample
mean and vary at the country and cohort level.29 Since parental income is widely accepted as an useful
approximation for parental investment in children, income inequality experienced in childhood can be
understood as a proxy for inequality of parental investment in children’s human capital, growth as an
indicator for increasing parental resources, and public expenditures in education as a proxy for public
investment in human capital (see Mayer and Lopoo, 2008).30 The γ -coefficients signal thus a positive
or negative change in the slope of the association of parents’ and children’s socioeconomic status
according to the mentioned characteristics experienced in childhood by the individuals.31 Standard
errors are clustered by country and year of birth.
4 Descriptive Analysis
4.1 Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility in Latin America
Latin America is an interesting laboratory to analyze inequality and intergenerational mobility. On
the one hand, the region is still characterized by high levels of inequality which are among the highest
from a global perspective (Alvaredo and Gasparini, 2015; Lustig et al., 2013). But on the other hand,
while worldwide inequality has been rising, most Latin American countries experienced a significant
decrease in inequality in the last decade (Gasparini et al., 2011; Gasparini and Lustig, 2011; Cord et al.,
2013). Figure 2a shows income inequality trends in Latin America.
Many studies dedicated in past to the study of intergenerational mobility in one or more countries
in Latin America. All basically confirm that mobility in Latin America is very low, as typically would
have been expected for development countries with high levels of inequality (among others Ander-
sen, 2003; Azevedo and Bouillon, 2010; Behrman et al., 2001; Binder and Woodruff, 2002; Dahan and
29Running estimations of equation (2) including cohort fixed effects do not change results significantly. Figure A1 shows
the variation of the macro level variables between countries and within countries over time.
30The limitations of this approach to identify a causal relationship are discussed in the conclusions.
31A similar methodology has been adopted byMayer and Lopoo (2008) to evaluate the relationship between government
spending and intergenerational mobility, and by Schütz et al. (2008) to analyze the effect of certain characteristics of the
education system on equality of opportunity. In a recent study, Cingano (2014) compares similarly the mean effect of
inequality on years of schooling, literacy and numeracy of people with different parental educational background (low,
middle, high) using PIACC data.
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Gaviria, 2001; Daude, 2011; Daude and Robano, 2015; Ferreira et al., 2013; Gaviria et al., 2007).32
These results are confirmed by the influential work by Hertz et al. (2008), which compares intergen-
erational mobility trends across countries. Unsurprisingly, the only four Latin American countries
included in the original Great Gatsby Curve by Miles Corak - Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru -
are situated in the upper right corner of the curve. Figure 2b shows the mean relative educational
position of children by their parents’ position in the pooled sample of Latin American countries using
Latinobarometro data. To construct this figure, parents’ relative educational position is subdivided
into 10 equal bins. The dots show the mean of the children’s position for each bin.
[Figures 2a and 2b here] [Table 1 here]
Although the different countries in Latin American have similar levels of inequality and intergen-
erational mobility if compared to developed countries – i.e. they would be situated in the same area of
the graph performing a global analysis – significant differences can be registered between them. Table 1
shows the estimated regression coefficients of equation (1) to measure intergenerational mobility, using
the normalized measures for parents’ and children’s mean educational position as explained in Section
3.2. In the first column, the results are displayed for people born between 1980 and 1995, and then the
period is subdivided in the older cohort and younger cohort as above; Figure A2 visualizes the results
graphically and indicates the statistical significance of changes in estimates within countries.33 The
rates of intergenerational mobility for the two cohorts are displayed separately in columns two and
three of Table 1. In a ranking of countries by their rates of intergenerational mobility, not all differ-
ences between countries are statistically significant, especially in the middle of the ranking. However,
countries at the top of the ranking have significantly higher mobility than countries at the bottom (a
pattern also found in earlier studies).34 The range of the intergenerational mobility estimates varies
from Venezuela and Mexico, where an increase of 10 percent in parental education relative to the mean
of their reference group is associated to a 2 percent increase in the children’s generation, to Chile and
Guatemala, where it is associated to an increase of 3.7 percent. As a benchmark, own estimates for
the US (PSID data) and Germany (SOEP data) using the same restrictions (at least 18 years old and
born between 1980 and 1995) and the applied linear transformation of completed years of education,
yield regression coefficients of 0.158 and 0.334, respectively. Countries where one cohort experienced
low (high) levels of mobility in comparison to the mean, also the subsequent cohort experiences low
(high) intergenerational mobility, as highlighted in Figure A3.
Since inequality has been declining in Latin America, the theoretical insights described in Section
2 suggest that younger cohorts should display higher levels of intergenerational mobility. Indeed, the
32A recent survey by Torche (2014) reviews the economic and sociological literature on intergenerational mobility in
Latin America.
33Regression coefficients obtained without normalization, as well as the intergenerational correlation, and different age
restrictions can be found in the Online Appendix.
34Figure A4 visualizes point estimates and confidence intervals graphically and ranks the countries by their degree of
intergenerational mobility.
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mean level of intergenerational mobility is higher in the younger cohort, and, as shown in Figure A2,
the estimated regression coefficients for the older cohort are greater than the ones for the younger
cohort in 12 out of 18 countries. In contrast, in Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Colombia, Panama, and
Honduras the younger cohort experienced lower intergenerational mobility than their older peers.
However, these changes are sometimes very small in both directions and not in all cases statistically
significant.35 The next sections will therefore focus on the relationship between changes in inequality
and changes in intergenerational mobility. First, in a stylized analysis in Section 4.2, and then, in a
more detailed microeconometric framework in Section 5.1.36
4.2 Stylized Facts on Latin America’s Great Gatsby Curve
With the results of the regression analysis displayed in Table 1 and the Gini coefficients of disposable
household per capita income in two benchmark years 1998 and 2006, the Great Gatsby Curve for
Latin America can be constructed, and displacements along the curve from one period to the next
can be observed.37 The corresponding cohorts for which intergenerational mobility is measured are
1980-1987 and 1988-1995, respectively, i.e. composed of adult respondents who were 11 to 18 years
old in one of the two benchmark years, an age where investment in human capital is fundamental. In
this part of the analysis, Colombia and Guatemala are excluded, because information on inequality
in SEDLAC data for these countries start in 2001 and 2000 respectively. Figure 3 shows the cross
country relationship in both periods, while Figure 4 shows the displacements within countries along
the curve. The expected positive relationship between intergenerational persistence and inequality
can be observed in both periods and in the joint analysis. Intergenerational mobility estimates across
countries are in a closer range for the older cohort, ranging from about 0.2 to 0.4, and more dispersed
35Statistical significance is measured using the pooled sample of the 1980-1995 cohort for each country separately, and
interacting the variable for parental educational position with a dummy signalizing the younger cohort. The changes in
mobility are only in six countries significant at the 0.05 level, and in four at the 0.01 level (See Figure A2). However, the
sample is relatively small in the younger cohort, varying from 660 observations in Panama to 1,448 in Nicaragua. Since
only in Bolivia and Brazil the Latinobarometro sample includes individuals who are 16 and 17 years old, in the main
analysis the sample is restricted to individuals who are at least 18 years old. The estimates change slightly, when different
age restrictions are imposed, what however also sensibly reduces the samples. Nevertheless, as can be seen in the Online
Appendix, the changes in estimates are not too serious. A comparison of estimates obtained from Latinobarometro data
with ones obtained from the seven countries where the harmonized household survey data is available shows that the
estimates are mainly consistent across countries, but differ sometimes regarding the two cohorts (See Online Appendix).
The main reason for this should be the different composition of the sample between Latinobarometro and the harmonized
household survey data as stated above, especially in the younger cohort (See Tables A1 to A4 for descriptive statistics).
36An alternative measurement of intergenerational mobility, called Social Mobility Index (SMI) and proposed by An-
dersen (2003), is included in the SEDLAC data for each year and country in which survey data is available. This index,
as well as its strength and limitations, are discussed in the Online Appendix. Since the limitations for an analysis of in-
tergenerational mobility probably outweigh the advantages, in the present study own measurements of intergenerational
mobility are estimated. In the Online Appendix, the SMI-1 and SMI-2 are reported for the sake of completeness, and
generally confirm the pattern of rising social intergenerational mobility in most Latin American countries. A comparison
of the SMI with the intergenerational mobility measure estimated in the present study can be also found in the Online
Appendix.
37As a robustness check, inequality has been also averaged from 1997 to 1999 and from 2005 to 2007 to measure the two
benchmark years, with no variation in the results.
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in the younger cohort, with a range from about 0.1 to 0.45. Inequality levels seem to be much more
diverse across countries in both benchmark years, a pattern which has already been highlighted in
earlier research (Gasparini et al., 2011).
[Figures 3 and 4 here]
As for the within country relationship between inequality and intergenerational mobility, 9 coun-
tries follow the expected displacements along the Great Gatsby Curve, as in the theoretically hypoth-
esized ceteris paribus framework: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras,
Paraguay, and Venezuela. In Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru, the younger cohort shows lower
mobility rates than their older peers, although at times were parental investment in their human cap-
ital was essential, incomes were more equally distributed. Opposite patterns are observed for the
Dominican Republic, Costa Rica and Uruguay, where mobility increased despite of higher income
inequality faced by the parental generation.
This stylized analysis gives a first intuitive overview of the problem, but certainly not a solution.
We see that the majority of countries follow the expected relationship over time, confirming the cross-
country findings of the Great Gatsby Curve. But at the same time, some countries “behave” differently.
Furthermore, as stated in the previous section, changes in mobility between the two cohorts are only
statistically significant in the case of five countries for which we have data on inequality: Honduras,
Paraguay and Venezuela, confirming the negative relationship, and Costa Rica and Nicaragua, rejecting
it. All together, these first findings seem to give some further reason for not rejecting the hypothesis
that cross-country heterogeneity is likely to be the main force behind the observed differences in
inequality and intergenerational mobility as some authors point out (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson,
2012; Ichino et al., 2011). Also, it might be argued that budget constrains limiting parental investment
in human capital are only of low importance, since high inequality and high mobility seem to coexist.
However, all interpretations at this point have to be taken very cautiously since the possible effect of
particular differences between countries does not allow to verify the hypothesis in detail. The analysis
in the following sections will therefore analyze the effect of inequality on intergenerational mobility
adopting a different approach that allows to control for cross-country heterogeneity.
5 Microeconometric Evaluation
5.1 Interactions
In the previous section, the analysis was merely descriptive and restricted to a stylized analysis at the
meta level. Now, a more detailed microeconometric set up is adopted which allows to test the hypoth-
esis of a negative relationship between inequality and intergenerational mobility.38 The methodology
38In a parallel project (Gasparini, Neidhöfer and Serrano, forthcoming), a novel cross country data set on intergen-
erational mobility trends is introduced over a span of over 50 years, which allows to analyze the relationship between
intergenerational mobility and inequality - or other features - in a macroeconometric set up.
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applied here and the underlying equations are described in detail in Section 3.2. Table 2, 3 and 4
show the main results with both data sets for the three specifications (A) Early childhood, (B) Primary
school age, and (C) Adolescence, respectively. Each specification comprises four different estimations of
equation (2).39
[Tables 2, 3 and 4 here]
The 4th rows show the intergenerational mobility parameter β at the mean of all the interacted
variables with parental educational position, i.e. inequality, growth and public investment in human
capital. The coefficients that display the interaction effect between parental educational position and
the characteristics of interest can be found in the first three rows. Basically, what is observed is that
there are different slopes in the conditional correlation of parents’ and children’s educational position
related to the macro-level characteristics. Inequality, measured by the Gini of household per capita
income, significantly changes the slope in all three specifications, with only slight changes when coun-
try fixed effects are included.40 This is a strong evidence for a negative relationship between inequality
and intergenerational mobility, which goes beyond cross country heterogeneity. Also, it might indi-
cate an important role of credit constrains limiting parental investment in children’s human capital in
Latin America, since one of the main reasons for the decline in inequality in the region has been the
provision of cash transfer programs to poor families and generally more exhaustive social spending
(Gasparini and Lustig, 2011). Besides, it gives also contrasting evidence to the hypothesis of higher
intergenerational mobility caused by higher returns to human capital investment, since the increase in
inequality in Latin America was driven by a downfall in the skill premium, too. These two possible
interpretations of the findings should be addressed more in detail in future research.
In economic theory, growth has been theorized to increase intergenerational mobility and, fur-
thermore, to drive income inequality (among others, Galor and Tsiddon, 1997; Galor and Moav,
2004; Hassler and Mora, 2000). On the other hand, many authors highlighted the key role of pub-
lic investment in human capital (among others Benabou, 1996; Davies et al., 2005; Solon, 2002) and
empirically confirmed a positive association with intergenerational mobility (e.g. Mayer and Lopoo,
2008). To test these hypotheses, the two features are included in the analysis. Including growth, mea-
sured by GDP per capita, the interaction effect of inequality with parental background is still positive,
but not significant in all specifications. The same pattern arises when public expenditure in education,
measured as percentage of GDP, is interacted with parental education.41 This highlights one impor-
tant channel which might be the main driver of the relationship, on the one hand, and confirm the
39Full Tables can be found in the Online Appendix.
40It is not surprising that including country fixed effects does not change the coefficients significantly, since the outcome
variables for parents and children has been normalized at the country level. In a robustness check keeping simply years of
completed schooling as outcome variables without any normalization, the coefficients indeed vary, but are still positive and
significant in all specifications, what confirms the negative relationship between inequality and intergenerational mobility,
controlling for cross-country heterogeneity.
41Performing the analysis with public expenditure per pupil as percentage of GDP per capita do not change the results
significantly.
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power of public investment in human capital to outweigh the lack of private investment, on the other.
Indeed, the coefficients of economic growth and public expenditures in education have the expected
negative sign, showing an enhancing effect on intergenerational mobility. The former might be related
to the strong decrease in poverty in Latin America of the last decades.42 Since growth has been mainly
pro-poor in Latin America, allowing a substantial middle class to rise and hence lowering income in-
equality (Ferreira et al., 2013), it gives further evidence for the important role of credit constraints.
The positive effect of public educational expenditures confirms latest findings, among others, by Aizer
(2014); Jerrim and Macmillan (2015); Herrington (2015); Holter (2015) on the importance of public
investment in human capital for intergenerational mobility, and equality of opportunity. The starting
age of compulsory education seems not to be associated with mobility.43
Robustness These results are robust to different specifications: First, in the main analysis using the
harmonized household survey data, all the available information on educational attainment of parents
and children is used to compute the relative educational position. A robustness check with the same
specification as in Latinobarometro data yields the same patterns. Second, if restricting the analysis
with Latinobarometro data to the countries for which household survey data is available, results are
very similar in specification (A) and (B), and differ slightly in (C).44 Third, another important issue
working with household survey data is weighting. Since the underlying sample is derived pooling data
from different waves of the survey in one case and different waves and countries in the other, results
obtained without using sampling weights should be the more appropriate ones. Anyway, results ob-
tained using weights do not differ significantly.45 Fourth, as further robustness check, the estimations
are performed both using simply completed years of education of parents and children, and the Z-Score
of own and parental education. Using these measures, the evidence is still more striking showing a
negative effect of inequality on intergenerational mobility. Last, different age restrictions imposed to
the sample – the main analysis is restricted to individuals who are at least 18 years old – yield very
similar results.46
5.2 Determinants of Intergenerational Mobility
The main results of the analysis until now, are that inequality is negatively associated with intergener-
ational mobility while the effect of economic growth and public expenditures in education is positive.
Furthermore, this effects turn out to be statistically significant. Now, the question is how econom-
42The fraction of people in Latin America living under the poverty line, fell from about 28 to 13 percent from the
middle of the 90ties to 2011 (Levy and Schady, 2013).
43As can be seen in Figure A1, the starting age of compulsory education also lacks in within country variation.
44Performing this robustness check, the only estimation which does not confirm the results of the main analysis is
obtained in specification (C) when including economic growth in the regression. Here, the interaction effect of inequality
on parental educational position turns negative significant (at 0.05 level). A sensitivity analysis shows that this result is
driven by Guatemala, which in fact has the more dispersed distribution of educational attainments in both samples.
45For a recent overview on sampling weights, see Solon et al. (2015).
46These and other robustness checks can be found in the Online Appendix.
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ically significant these results are and how to interpret them. Since both parental education and the
macro-level variables – inequality (Q, measured by the Gini coefficient), growth (G, measured by GDP
per capita), and public investment in human capital (Z, measured by public expenditures in education
as percentage of GDP) – are continuous, the coefficient of parental education measures the mean effect
of those variables at value 0 which is by construction the sample mean.
The points in Figure A6 show the marginal effects of the interaction with parental educational
background measured at different levels of inequality, economic growth, and public investment in
human capital. The estimations control for country fixed effects and additionally for GDP and GDP
per capita when the effect of public expenditures in education is measured. A statistically significant
effect at economically plausible levels of inequality, growth, and public expenditure in education is
found in all three specifications, (A) Early childhood, (B) Primary school age, and (C) Adolescence.
As for the magnitude of the effect, intergenerational mobility - i.e. the gradient of parental educational
background - varies significantly at relatively sharp shifts in inequality and growth and at moderate
changes in public expenditure in education.47
When the Gini coefficient changes by 0.15, intergenerational mobility varies from 9 to 12 percent
depending on the specification of the lifetime period of evaluation. The sharpest change in the slope
can be observed when measuring inequality in early childhood (specification A), a statistically sig-
nificant change is observed when measuring inequality in adolescence (specification C). A change in
inequality of similar magnitude has actually been experienced by Bolivia and Ecuador where inequal-
ity fell from a Gini coefficient of about 0.6 at the end of the nineties to 0.45 in the late 2000s. In the
other countries where inequality has been falling, the change was within a range of 0.02 to 0.1 Gini
points in this period.48
Changes in economic growth affect intergenerational mobility significantly between 5 and 8 per-
cent of the gradient when GDP per capita changes by 2000 USD. The most remarkable change in
the slope is observed, again, measuring growth in early childhood. In the case of economic growth
measured by GDP per capita, the interpretation is more complex because of some contrasting facts.
On the one hand, an increase of 2000 USD in GDP per capita is mostly a long run process for a devel-
oping country and actually never occurred in some Latin American countries like Bolivia, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua since 1970 until now. For some countries, like Brazil and Colombia, it has
been a process lasting 30 and 40 years, while in others like Chile, Costa Rica, and Panama, GDP per
capita rose by 2000 USD or more within a decade.49 On the other hand, since year of birth varies in
the sample from 1970 to 1995, the time horizon comprises 25 years which might be enough for such
a development to take place. Furthermore, GDP per capita is arguably the right measure to compare
economic growth between different countries over time, but information on within country char-
acteristics like well-being is probably not caught up. For instance, the cost of education might be an
47The full table displaying all marginal effects can be found in the Online Appendix.
48Inequality trends in Latin America obtained from SEDLAC data are displayed in Figure 2a.
49See Figure A5a for GDP per capita trends in Latin America obtained from World Bank data.
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important factor, too, as well as consumption levels. Moreover, the dynamics of technological progress
should be investigated more in detail. The results of this study point at an overall significant influence
of economic growth on intergenerational mobility, but future research should focus on the questions
above to allow a more precise interpretation. As a last remark, the relatively higher importance of
economic growth (and inequality) experienced in early childhood seems to confirm that investment
in human capital is especially important in early periods of lifetime.
The most important factor besides private investment in children’s human capital has been the-
orized to be public investment through the provision of access to education. In the present study,
public investment in human capital is measured by public expenditure in education as percentage of
GDP.50 Holding GDP and GDP per capita constant, a change of public expenditures in education by
two percentage points significantly changes intergenerational mobility estimates by 7 to 9 percent.51
At the relatively low levels of public expenditures in education in Latin America, an increase by
two percentage points can be a duplication of the efforts in absolute terms; for example, in Ecuador,
Nicaragua, and Uruguay public expenditures in education were around two percent of GDP in early
2000s. Nevertheless, most countries indeed experienced such a change, especially in the period from
2000 to 2010.52 Public investment in human capital is confirmed, thus, as an important channel to
replace private investment and, therefore, to increase intergenerational mobility.
Non-linearities An analysis of non-linear patterns in the relationships shows an even more striking
picture (see Figure A7): The negative interaction of income inequality with intergenerational mobil-
ity is particularly strong for families with lower educational positions, while children from higher
educated parents increase their relative educational position with rising inequality. The same patterns
has been found by Cingano (2014) for OECD countries and by Kerney and Levine (2016) for high
school drop out rates in the US. The reverse applies to growth and public education: Low educated
families profit most in terms of upward mobility from rising GDP per capita and public expenditures
in education.53
6 Conclusions
The findings of this study fill the gap on multi-country and multi-period evidence on the relation-
ship between inequality and intergenerational mobility, confirming for the first time that the Great
Gatsby Curve exists also within multiple countries over time. In particular, the relationship between
50And also, by the starting age of compulsory education, which however shows to have no significant effect on intergen-
erational mobility and is therefore not further evaluated in this part of the analysis.
51The results do not change significantly if including the duration of compulsory education as further control variable
in the estimations.
52See Figure A5b for public expenditure in education trends in Latin America obtained from World Bank data.
53These results are obtained subdividing the distribution of parental educational position into three quantiles (low,
middle and high) and predicting the individual relative educational position by parental educational level for different
degrees of income inequality, growth and public education expenditures.
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income inequality and intergenerational mobility has been tested using two different sets of harmo-
nized household survey data for 18 Latin American countries. The presence of a negative relationship
– as hypothesized by economic theory and suggested by cross country comparisons – has been con-
firmed, controlling for cross country heterogeneity and other institutional characteristics. Hereby,
the probably most compelling evidence is the link found in this study between income inequality
experienced in childhood and intergenerational mobility as adults. The analysis of different patterns
across the distribution shows that especially the upward mobility of individuals with low parental ed-
ucational background is seriously limited with higher levels of inequality, while individuals with high
parental background even improve their relative educational position. In further analyses, economic
growth could be established as one of the main channels behind the relationship in Latin America,
while public expenditures in education as an important contrasting force. Since the two sets of micro
data include the same countries but derive from completely different sources – one from official public
institutions and the other from non-governmental sources – obtaining the same patterns with both is
a strong evidence for the robustness of these results.
It can, therefore, be concluded that (private and public) investment in human capital is determinant
for intergenerational mobility, and a strongly dispersed distribution of this feature seriously challenges
equality of opportunity in a society. Nevertheless, to establish a clear causal link between income
inequality and intergenerational mobility is a challenging task. For instance, as addressed carefully in
section 2, different mechanism underlie the relationship: parental resources and investment, people’s
preferences, public investments, and generally institutional characteristics (including cultural aspects).
Actually, the institutional background of particular countries could drive both, income inequality
and social intergenerational mobility, and suggest a relationship which would in fact be spurious; a
common critique towards cross country evaluations. The present analysis shows however, that holding
these and other heterogeneous effects at the country level constant, the negative relationship between
income inequality and intergenerational mobility still persists. As argued above, if parental income is
a good approximation for parental investment in children as usually assumed in the literature, income
inequality experienced in childhood should be a valid proxy for the dispersion of parental investment.
At the same time, economic growth should measure rising parental resources and the same should be
true for public expenditures in education as a proxy for public investment in human capital (see Mayer
and Lopoo, 2008). Still, these proxies are imperfect and the exact identification of a causal effect would
require an exogenous source of variation in private and public investment in children’s human capital.
It goes beyond the scope of this study, which was to test if the relationship between income inequality
and intergenerational transmission of human capital is only an artifact of cross country heterogeneity
or not, to identify the exact mechanisms behind the relationship. These mechanisms, and especially
the channels of intergenerational transmission within families, remain a topic of great research interest
and will be analyzed in great detail in future.
Ample space for further research on the subject is left open. For example, the role of economic
growth and development might be evaluated differently, like through technological progress, poverty
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reduction, or the strength of institutions. Also, the multiple dimensions of public investment in hu-
man capital should be analyzed more in detail. An especially interesting question is, for example, if
spending in primary, secondary and tertiary education have diverging effects on intergenerational mo-
bility. Further insights might arise analyzing different forms of redistributive policies, taxation, health
care etc. At the same time, although school enrollment and attendance (as well as health outcomes)
increased especially among the poor in consequence of the wide spread social programs in Latin Amer-
ica, educational systems still lag behind in quality, and the evidence on the long run effectiveness on
human capital and well being is still mixed (e.g. Cruces et al., 2014; Levy and Schady, 2013). Although
the sensitivity analysis performed in the present study shows that a measure of relative educational
position can be constructed which is highly correlated with income and socioeconomic status, future
research should address these points more in detail.
In conclusion, this is one of very few studies analyzing the relationship between inequality and in-
tergenerational mobility in developing countries. The implications should be applicable to developed
countries as well, if no other differing mechanisms play a fundamental role. It is left for future research
to empirically verify this last question.
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7 Tables & Figures
Figure 1: Educational attainment as a proxy for well being: Years of Education vs. Relative Educational
Position. (Data: Latinobarometro 2013, own estimations)
(a) Subjective Income
(b) Interviewer’s assessment of socioeconomic status
(c) Number of goods
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Figure 2: Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility in Latin America
(a) Inequality - Gini of disposable household per capita income (Data: SEDLAC)
(b) Intergenerational Mobility - Binned scatter plot of mean child position by parental background
(Data: Latinobarometro, own estimates)
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Table 1: Intergenerational mobility in Latin America: Regression Coefficients (Data: Latino-
barometro, own estimates)
(1) (2) (3)
Cohort 1980-1995 1980-1987 1988-1995
Argentina 0.242∗∗∗ (0.0069) 0.243∗∗∗ (0.0075) 0.237∗∗∗ (0.0170)
Bolivia 0.248∗∗∗ (0.0137) 0.255∗∗∗ (0.0171) 0.224∗∗∗ (0.0073)
Brazil 0.254∗∗∗ (0.0082) 0.257∗∗∗ (0.0094) 0.244∗∗∗ (0.0179)
Chile 0.374∗∗∗ (0.0196) 0.382∗∗∗ (0.0212) 0.346∗∗∗ (0.0470)
Colombia 0.291∗∗∗ (0.0131) 0.289∗∗∗ (0.0154) 0.303∗∗∗ (0.0175)
Costa Rica 0.267∗∗∗ (0.0145) 0.287∗∗∗ (0.0143) 0.204∗∗∗ (0.0140)
Dominican Rep. 0.253∗∗∗ (0.0150) 0.257∗∗∗ (0.0187) 0.242∗∗∗ (0.0226)
Ecuador 0.318∗∗∗ (0.0097) 0.319∗∗∗ (0.0115) 0.318∗∗∗ (0.0165)
El Salvador 0.256∗∗∗ (0.0110) 0.263∗∗∗ (0.0120) 0.239∗∗∗ (0.0163)
Guatemala 0.373∗∗∗ (0.0147) 0.398∗∗∗ (0.0157) 0.312∗∗∗ (0.0198)
Honduras 0.358∗∗∗ (0.0201) 0.334∗∗∗ (0.0204) 0.441∗∗∗ (0.0115)
Mexico 0.200∗∗∗ (0.0110) 0.199∗∗∗ (0.0136) 0.205∗∗∗ (0.0131)
Nicaragua 0.294∗∗∗ (0.0118) 0.280∗∗∗ (0.0110) 0.340∗∗∗ (0.0218)
Panama 0.328∗∗∗ (0.0120) 0.323∗∗∗ (0.0120) 0.348∗∗∗ (0.0365)
Paraguay 0.234∗∗∗ (0.0228) 0.289∗∗∗ (0.0154) 0.128∗∗∗ (0.0385)
Peru 0.286∗∗∗ (0.0071) 0.281∗∗∗ (0.0060) 0.305∗∗∗ (0.0237)
Uruguay 0.329∗∗∗ (0.0086) 0.338∗∗∗ (0.0087) 0.310∗∗∗ (0.0233)
Venezuela 0.199∗∗∗ (0.0127) 0.212∗∗∗ (0.0123) 0.141∗∗∗ (0.0241)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 62729 46849 15880
R2 0.226 0.230 0.227
Regression coefficients of own vs. parental relative educational position (see Section 3.2 and Figure 1). Demo-
graphic controls comprise sex, age (polynomial), and survey year. Data: Latinobarometro 1998-2013. Statistical
significance level * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Benchmark for Cohort 1980-1995: USA (PSID, own estimates) 0.158,
Germany (SOEP v30, own estimates) 0.334.
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Figure 3: Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility in Latin America - The Great Gatsby Curve I
(a) The Great Gatsby Curve - Older cohort
(b) The Great Gatsby Curve - Younger cohort
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Figure 4: Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility in Latin America - The Great Gatsby Curve II
(a) Displacements along the Great Gatsby Curve
(b) Relative changes in inequality and mobility
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Table 2: Specification (A) Early Childhood: Interaction of inequality, growth, and public educational
expenditures experienced in age interval from 0 to 6 with intergenerational mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Latinobarometro (18 countries) Harmonized Household Surveys (9 countries)
PB×Gini(0≤ age≤ 6) 0.192∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.363∗∗ 1.217∗∗∗ 1.251∗∗∗ 0.246 -1.189
(0.0667) (0.0667) (0.0719) (0.1639) (0.2699) (0.2725) (0.4435) (1.6530)
PB×GDPp.c.(0≤ age≤ 6) -0.014∗∗∗ -0.013∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.016∗
(0.0039) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0082)
PB×Compulsory(0≤ age≤ 6) -0.000 0.027
(0.0113) (0.0255)
Parental Background (PB) 0.256∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0069) (0.0099) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0108) (0.0223)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33007 33007 33007 15777 63843 63843 63843 22362
R2 0.193 0.193 0.194 0.192 0.207 0.208 0.209 0.150
#Clusters(Country/Cohort) 193 193 193 138 54 54 54 28
Table 3: Specification (B) Primary School Age: Interaction of inequality, growth, and public educa-
tional expenditures experienced in age interval from 6 to 12 with intergenerational mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Latinobarometro (18 countries) Harmonized Household Surveys (9 countries)
PB×Gini(6≤ age≤ 12) 0.130∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.048 0.107 0.826∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗
(0.0651) (0.0651) (0.0609) (0.0745) (0.2157) (0.2124) (0.2140) (0.4030)
PB×GDPp.c.(6≤ age≤ 12) -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0033) (0.0035)
PB×Pub.Educ(6≤ age≤ 12) -0.009∗∗ -0.016∗
(0.0039) (0.0090)
Parental Background (PB) 0.254∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0048) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0070) (0.0080)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 62911 62911 62911 53912 139610 139610 139610 130915
R2 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.179 0.225 0.225 0.226 0.225
#Clusters(Country/Cohort) 290 290 290 255 97 97 97 85
Please, see the notes on the next page.
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Table 4: Specification (C) Adolescence: Interaction of inequality, growth, and public educational
expenditures experienced in age interval from 12 to18 with intergenerational mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Latinobarometro (18 countries) Harmonized Household Surveys (9 countries)
PB×Gini(12≤ age≤ 18) 0.221∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.101 0.109 0.832∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 1.681∗∗∗
(0.0701) (0.0701) (0.0637) (0.0673) (0.2708) (0.2619) (0.2215) (0.2491)
PB×GDPp.c.(12≤ age≤ 18) -0.009∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0018)
PB×Pub.Educ(12≤ age≤ 18) -0.014∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0064)
Parental Background (PB) 0.257∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0056) (0.0042)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 87937 87937 87907 78845 203787 203787 203787 195320
R2 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.181 0.240 0.241 0.242 0.241
#Clusters(Country/Cohort) 365 365 364 329 134 134 134 128
Notes: Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the coefficients of linear regressions with the individual relative educa-
tional position as dependent variable (see Section 3.2 and Figure 1) for three different specifications.
The specifications reflect three different choices for the age interval (t0 ≤ age ≤ t1) when the macroe-
conomic characteristics are matched to the individual: Specification (A) is the age interval from 0 to
6 years (0 ≤ age ≤ 6); Specification (B) from 6 to 12 (6 ≤ age ≤ 12); Specification (C) from 12 to 18
(12≤ age≤ 18). The macroeconomic characteristics are measured as mean values from year x+ t0 to
year x+ t1 and vary at the country and cohort level. Individual level data: Latinobarometro columns
1-4, Harmonized household surveys columns 5-8 (see Section 3.1). Demographic controls comprise
sex, age (polynomial), and survey year. PB = Parental Relative Educational Position (see Section 3.2).
Macroeconomic characteristics (interaction terms): Gini(t0 ≤ age≤ t1) =Mean of the Gini coefficient
of household per capita income measured in home country in the years corresponding to the age in-
terval (SEDLAC Data). GDPp.c.(t0 ≤ age≤ t1) = GDP per capita measured in home country in the
years corresponding to the age interval (World Bank Data). Compulsory(t0 ≤ age≤ t1) = Starting age
of compulsory education measured in home country in the years corresponding to the age interval
(World Bank Data). Pub.Educ(t0 ≤ age ≤ t1) = Public expenditures in education as percentage of
GDP measured in home country in the years corresponding to the age interval (World Bank Data).
Cluster adjusted s.e. by country and cohort (in parentheses). Statistical significance level * 0.1 ** 0.05
*** 0.01.
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Table A1: Latinobarómetro; Databases 1998, 2000-2011, 2013.
Country Year of birth (sd) (min) (max) Age (sd) (min) (max) Male (sd) (min) (max)
Argentina 1980 5.97 1970 1995 26.26 5.92 18 43 0.49 0.50 0 1
Bolivia 1980 6.20 1970 1995 26.11 6.10 18 43 0.49 0.50 0 1
Brazil 1980 6.08 1970 1995 26.64 6.16 18 43 0.49 0.50 0 1
Chile 1979 6.20 1970 1995 26.75 6.18 18 43 0.49 0.50 0 1
Colombia 1980 6.09 1970 1995 26.45 6.04 18 43 0.49 0.50 0 1
Costa Rica 1980 6.16 1970 1995 26.31 6.12 18 43 0.49 0.50 0 1
Dominican Rep. 1981 6.33 1970 1995 27.02 6.32 18 43 0.49 0.50 0 1
Ecuador 1980 6.20 1970 1995 26.30 6.00 18 43 0.49 0.50 0 1
El Salvador 1980 5.97 1970 1995 26.04 5.75 18 43 0.48 0.50 0 1
Guatemala 1980 6.16 1970 1995 25.83 5.90 18 43 0.48 0.50 0 1
Honduras 1980 6.12 1970 1995 25.85 5.88 18 43 0.49 0.50 0 1
Mexico 1979 6.02 1970 1995 26.67 6.03 18 43 0.47 0.50 0 1
Nicaragua 1980 6.00 1970 1995 25.74 5.79 18 43 0.48 0.50 0 1
Panama 1980 6.20 1970 1995 26.58 6.10 18 43 0.48 0.50 0 1
Paraguay 1981 6.40 1970 1995 26.48 6.33 18 43 0.50 0.50 0 1
Peru 1980 6.20 1970 1995 26.33 6.10 18 43 0.49 0.50 0 1
Uruguay 1980 6.22 1970 1995 26.76 6.11 18 43 0.50 0.50 0 1
Venezuela 1980 6.02 1970 1995 26.28 5.93 18 43 0.50 0.50 0 1
Weighted Sample Statistics: Means and Standard Deviations by Country.
Table A2: Harmonized Household Surveys
Country Year of birth (sd) (min) (max) Age (sd) (min) (max) Male (sd) (min) (max)
Brazil 1976 5.17 1970 1990 27.75 5.67 18 38 0.42 0.49 0 1
Chile 1979 6.22 1970 1995 31.04 6.23 18 43 0.36 0.48 0 1
Colombia 1981 6.73 1970 1995 29.38 6.73 18 43 0.46 0.50 0 1
Ecuador 1976 4.90 1970 1988 24.89 4.96 18 36 0.45 0.50 0 1
Guatemala 1980 6.15 1970 1993 27.61 6.05 18 41 0.43 0.49 0 1
Mexico 1978 5.94 1970 1991 28.67 6.16 18 39 0.42 0.49 0 1
Nicaragua 1975 3.17 1970 1980 22.95 3.17 18 28 0.44 0.50 0 1
Panama 1978 5.46 1970 1990 26.75 5.54 18 38 0.46 0.50 0 1
Peru 1976 4.98 1970 1995 31.35 5.57 18 43 0.78 0.41 0 1
Weighted Sample Statistics: Means and Standard Deviations by Country. Brazil: PNAD 1982, 1988, 1996; PDSD 2008. Chile: CASEN 2006, 2009, 2011, 2013. Colombia: ECV 2003, 2008, 2010-2013.
Ecuador: ECV 1994, 1995, 1998, 2006. Guatemala: ENCOVI 2000, 2006, 2011. Mexico: MXFLS 2002, 2005, 2006, 2009-2012. Nicaragua: EMNV 1998. Panama: ENV 1997, 2003, 2009. Peru: ENAHO
2001-2012.
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Table A3: Latinobarómetro; Databases 1998, 2000-2011, 2013.
Country Years of education (sd) (min) (max) Y. of parental education (sd) (min) (max) N
Argentina 11.05 2.62 0 15 9.00 3.67 0 15 6634
Bolivia 9.62 4.10 0 15 6.13 5.39 0 15 7881
Brazil 8.79 3.69 0 15 5.81 4.36 0 15 6822
Chile 10.70 3.06 0 15 8.99 4.04 0 15 5986
Colombia 9.84 3.96 0 15 7.05 4.86 0 15 7461
Costa Rica 8.67 3.58 0 15 7.03 4.43 0 15 6030
Dominican Rep. 9.18 4.05 0 15 6.66 5.06 0 15 3926
Ecuador 9.71 3.74 0 15 6.93 4.47 0 15 7843
El Salvador 8.17 4.41 0 15 4.79 5.02 0 15 6635
Guatemala 6.19 4.68 0 15 4.28 4.68 0 15 6757
Honduras 6.33 4.31 0 15 4.11 4.39 0 15 6953
Mexico 9.39 3.69 0 15 7.02 4.70 0 15 8035
Nicaragua 7.46 4.44 0 15 5.28 5.26 0 15 6540
Panama 9.82 3.98 0 15 7.40 4.91 0 15 5634
Paraguay 9.31 3.46 0 15 6.02 3.93 0 15 6245
Peru 10.68 3.49 0 15 8.30 4.92 0 15 7800
Uruguay 9.66 2.97 0 15 8.23 3.62 0 15 5793
Venezuela 9.93 3.34 0 15 7.22 4.34 0 15 7191
Weighted Sample Statistics: Means and Standard Deviations by Country.
Table A4: Harmonized Household Surveys
Country Years of education (sd) (min) (max) Y. of parental education (sd) (min) (max) N
Brazil 8.40 4.49 0 22 5.30 4.42 0 22 18219
Chile 12.03 3.16 0 22 9.22 4.40 0 25 130750
Colombia 9.51 4.27 0 23 5.75 4.29 0 17 101040
Ecuador 9.02 3.87 0 22 6.54 4.41 0 20 17212
Guatemala 5.52 4.55 0 20 3.12 3.99 0 20 33517
Mexico 9.31 3.55 0 18 5.70 4.68 0 18 5883
Nicaragua 6.15 3.97 0 17 3.94 3.99 0 17 2360
Panama 9.97 4.23 0 24 7.57 4.96 0 17 12308
Peru 9.86 3.86 0 19 6.20 4.96 0 17 66175
Weighted Sample Statistics: Means and Standard Deviations by Country. Brazil: PNAD 1982, 1988, 1996; PDSD 2008. Chile: CASEN 2006, 2009, 2011, 2013. Colombia: ECV 2003, 2008, 2010-2013.
Ecuador: ECV 1994, 1995, 1998, 2006. Guatemala: ENCOVI 2000, 2006, 2011. Mexico: MXFLS 2002, 2005, 2006, 2009-2012. Nicaragua: EMNV 1998. Panama: ENV 1997, 2003, 2009. Peru: ENAHO
2001-2012.
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Figure A1: Variation of the independent macro-level variables between and within countries by co-
horts
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Figure A2: Intergenerational mobility in Latin America - Magnitude and statistical significance of
changes in point estimates (Data: Latinobarometro, own estimates)
Figure A3: Intergenerational mobility in Latin America - Correlation in levels (Data: Latino-
barometro, own estimates)
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Figure A4: Intergenerational mobility in Latin America - Point estimates and confidence intervals
(Data: Latinobarometro, own estimates)
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Figure A5: Trends in Latin America
(a) GDP per capita
(b) Public expenditures in education
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Figure A6: Determinants of intergenerational mobility - Marginal effects; See Section 5.2
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Figure A7: Non-linearities in the determinants of intergenerational mobility - Marginal effects by
parental educational position
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B ONLINE APPENDIX - For online publication
Available at https://sites.google.com/site/guidoneidhoefer/research/supplements
Data
Latinobarometro http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp
SEDLAC http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/
World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/
Some graphics are generated using the software binscatter by Michael Stepner.
https://michaelstepner.com/binscatter/
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